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Education Code §§48900, 48901, 48902, 48903, 48903.5, 48905,
48906, 48907, 48910, 48911, 48912 (repealed); §§48900, 48900.2,
48901, 48903, 48903.5, 48903.6, 48904, 48904.5, 48905 (new);
§§35291, 48909, 48914, 48915 (amended).
AB 530 (Hart); STATS 1977, Ch 965
Support: American Civil Liberties Union; American Federation of
Teachers; California School Board Assocation
Chapter 965 appears to make fundamental changes in the disciplinary
systems used in California public schools. Prior to the enactment of Chapter
965, teachers and principles could suspend and governing boards could
expel pupils upon a showing of "good cause" [See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§48901-48903.5, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1010, §2, at -].
Chapter 965 has narrowed the discretionary application of suspension and
expulsion as disciplinary measures by substituting specific criteria against
which such decisions by teachers [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48901], principals
[CAL. EDUC. CODE §48903], and governing boards [CAL. EDUC. CODE
§48904.5] must be measured. The new exclusive grounds for suspension
and expulsion are: (1) causing, threatening, or attempting to cause property
damage or physical injury to another except in self-defense; (2) possessing,
selling, or furnishing a firearm, knife, explosive, or other dangerous object
of no reasonable use; (3) unlawfully possessing, using, selling, or being
under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or intoxicant of any kind; (4)
possessing or using tobacco on school premises except as allowed by
Section 48903.6 of the Education Code; (5) committing an obscene act or
engaging in habitual profanity or vulgarity; and (6) disrupting school activi-
ty or willfully defying valid school authority [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48900].
For the purposes of Chapter 965 "suspension" means exclusion of a pupil
from regular classroom instruction for adjustment purposes [CAL. EDUC.
CODE §48900]. Furthermore, the legislature has expressly indicated that
alternatives to suspension or expulsion are to be imposed against students
who are tardy, truant, or otherwise absent from school [CAL. EDUC. CODE
§48900]. Additionally, the failure of other means of correction to bring
about proper conduct is a precondition to suspension [CAL. EDuc. CODE
§48900.2] or expulsion [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48904.5], although the princi-
pal may suspend a pupil on any of the above listed grounds if a determina-
tion is made that the pupil's continued presence causes danger to persons or
property or is a threat to disrupt the educational process [CAL. EDUC. CODE
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§48900.2]. Testimony of educational professionals as to their past experi-
ence with particular behavior and its effect on the educational process has
been held sufficient to support a suspension on this exceptional ground
[Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 522 (C.D. Cal.
1969); Montalvo v. Madera Unified School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal.
App. 3d 323, 330, 98 Cal. Rptr. 593, 598 (1971)].
Under the prior law there were no definite time limits applied to the
decisional and appellate procedures required for the administration of pupil
discipline [See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§48900, 48910, as amended,
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1010, §2, at -]. Chapter 965 incorporates several
such requirements. All parents and guardians must now be notified by the
governing board of the availability of district rules pertaining to student
discipline, and each entering or continuing student must be provided with
such rules each school year [CAL. EDUC. CODE §35291]. Prior to the actual
suspension of a pupil, Chapter 965 requires that a principal hold an informal
conference with a pupil, during which the pupil must be informed of the
reason for the disciplinary action, presented with the evidence against him
or her, and given an opportunity to present his or her version and evidence in
defense [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48903(b)]. This conference may be postponed
for a period not to exceed 72 hours from the time suspension was ordered
only if the continued presence of the pupil poses a clear and present danger
to the lives, safety or health of school pupils or personnel [CAL. EDUC.
CODE §48903(c)]. Further, within 24 hours of the beginning of a suspension
the principal must attempt to notify the pupil's parent or guardian, orally and
in writing, of the reasons for and duration of the suspension, the right of the
parent or guardian to seek administrative review of the suspension in a
meeting with the district superintendent, and the requirement that the parent
or guardian respond to a request for a meeting with school officials to
discuss the/pupil's behavior [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48903(e)]. In response to a
request for administrative review, the superintendent must hold a meeting
withir three school days of the request and render a decision within two
school days of the meeting [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48904]. In cases of expul-
sion, prior law entitled the pupil and his or her parent or guardian to a
hearing before the district governing board or an appointed hearing officer
or panel [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48914, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1010, §2, at 1211]. Chapter 965 adds time constraints to this process by now
requiring that a notice of this hearing be forwarded to the pupil and his or her
parent or guardian at least ten days prior thereto [CAL. EDUC. CODE
§48914(g)], that the hearing be held within 20 calendar days of the date
expulsion is recommended or 25 calendar days of the date suspension is
ordered, whichever is shorter [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48914(a)], and that a
determination be made within three calendar days of completion of this
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hearing [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48914(d)]. Prior law entitled the pupil and his
or her parent or guardian to appeal a governing board expulsion decision to
the county board of education [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48915, as amended,
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1010, §2, at 1213]; Chapter 965 now requires that the
county board hold an appeal hearing within 20 calendar days of the request
and render a decision within three calendar days of the hearing [CAL. EDUC.
CODE §48915].
Finally, Chapter 965 also extends specific statutory rights to pupils by
now providing that: (1) pupils must be allowed to complete all assignments
and tests missed during a suspension, if practicable, and receive credit
therefor [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48903.5]; (2) pupils may neither be penalized
for, nor have their reinstatement conditioned upon, parental response to a
school conference request [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48903]; (3) governing board
decisions adverse to the pupil must be supported by a preponderance of,
rather than substantial, evidence [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48914]; (4) law
enforcement officers apparently may no longer notify school districts of
pupil drug abuse arrests that do not lead to either a complaint or a juvenile
court petition, an action that was a discretionary entitlement under the prior
law [Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE §48904, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 1010, §2, at - with CAL. EDUC. CODE §48922]; and (5) a pupil may
have a designated representative accompany him or her to a suspension
hearing, although the representative may not act as legal counsel unless the
district is so represented [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48904(c)].
Thus, Chapter 965 has made three fundamental changes in the discipli-
nary systems practiced in the California public schools by: (1) narrowing the
discretion of school officials as to the imposition of disciplinary suspensions
and expulsions; (2) establishing review procedures for each level of the
administrative structure, i.e., school, local district and county board of
education; and (3) extended statutory rights to public school pupils.
COMMENT
These revisions to the California Education Code apparently are in re-
sponse to the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Goss v.
Lopez [419 U.S. 565 (1975)] in which the Court applied the requirements of
procedural due process to suspensions of public school pupils [Id. at 574].
In Goss the Court found an Ohio statute, which permitted arbitrary suspen-
sions of students from the public schools [See OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§3313.66 (Page), as enacted, 1961 Ohio Laws 129 v. 239 §1], to be
unconstitutional in light of an Ohio statutory provision that extended a right
to a free education to all children between the ages of six and 21 [419 U.S.
at 567. See generally OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §3313.64 (Page), as enacted,
1963 Ohio Laws 130 v. 750 §1]. The Court held that "[h]aving chosen to
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extend the right to an education of people of appellee's class generally, Ohio
may not withdraw the right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally
fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred" [419
U.S. at 574].
California has extended this same right to education by virtue of two
constitutional provisions calling for legislative encouragement of education
and the creation of a system of "free schools" in each district of the state
and the statutory prescription for a compulsory full-time education for all
persons between the ages of six and 16 [See Piper v. Big Pine School Dist.,
193 Cal. 664, 670, 226 P. 926, 929 (1926). See generally CAL. CONST. art.
9, §§ 1, 5; CAL. EDUC. CODE §48200]. Thus, the procedures established by
Chapter 965 to be followed in the suspension or expulsion of a pupil from a
public school in California must be examined in light of Goss to determine
whether they meet the procedural due process requirements set forth in that
case.
Goss required only "rudimentary" due process procedures defined as
"oral or written notice [to the student] of the charges against him and, if he
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story" [419 U.S. at 581]. Chapter 965
appears to codify these requirements by mandating a principal-pupil confer-
ence that incorporates all of the procedural due process elements outlined by
Goss and by requiring that such a conference be held prior to the imposition
of any disciplinary suspension [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48903(b)]. The Court
went on to state, however, that "[1]onger suspensions or expulsion for the
remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures," and they did not "put aside the possibility that in unusual
situations, although involving only a short suspension [less than ten days],
something more than rudimentary procedure will be required" [419 U.S. at
584]. Thus, beyond the provisions of Section 48903, which appear to satisfy
all of the specific procedural due process requirements of Goss, Chapter 965
appears to be an attempt by the legislature to anticipate these "longer
suspensions" and "unusual situations" by providing the additional and
more formal procedures suggested by this Supreme Court decision.
See Generally:
1) 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §315 (disciplinary action
against students) (8th ed. 1974).
2) Comment, Notice and Hearing Required for Short Term Suspension from High School, 10
LAND & WATER L. REV. 607 (1975).
3) Comment, Due Process Rights and High School Suspensions After Goss v. Lopez, 36
MONT. L. REV. 333 (1975).
4) Comment, Due Process in School Discipline: The Effect of Goss v. Lopez, 12 SAN DIECGo
L.J. 912 (1975).
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Education; student newspapers
Education Code §48916 (amended).
SB 357 (Dills); STATS 1977, Ch 776
Support: American Civil Liberties Union; California School Boards As-
sociation
Chapter 776 extends both freedom of speech and freedom of the press to
public school students who had previously been granted only the "right to
exercise free expression" [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48916, as amended, CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1011, §2, at -]. As a result of this broader statement of
first amendment rights, public school students may now, with specified
exceptions, express themselves freely in official school publications and by
other means, regardless of whether the publication or other means of
expression are supported by school financing or the use of school facilities
[CAL. EDUC. CODE §48916]. "Official publication" is defined as any
material produced by students in journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or
writing classes and distributed to the student body either free or for a fee
[CAL. EDUC. CODE §48916]. Section 48916 of the Education Code, howev-
er, continues to prohibit any expression that is obscene, libelous or slander-
ous, or that so incites students as to create a clear and present danger of
either: (1) the commission of unlawful acts on school premises; (2) the
violation of lawful school regulations; or (3) the substantial disruption of
orderly school operation. Unless the student publication contains writing
that is violative of one of these prohibitions, Section 48916 expressly
prohibits prior restraint on any material prepared for such a publication.
Furthermore, should school officials object to the substance of certain
"student expression," the burden is now upon these officials to justify, any
limitations on student expression before imposing them and to do so "with-
out undue delay" [CAL. EDUC. CODE §48916]. Apparently to assure adher-
ence to the provisions of Chapter 776, local governing boards and county
boards of education are directed to embody the substance of Section 48916
in a "written publications code," which is to include reasonable provisions
for the time, place, and manner of conducting activities related to the
preparation and distribution of student publications [CAL. EDUC. CODE
§48916]. Furthermore, student editors now have complete editorial control
over "official school publications," while school advisers are responsible
for compliance with the provisions of Section 48916 as well as the mainte-
nance of professional standards of English and journalism. Although Chap-
ter 776 does attach "responsibility" for maintenance of its provisions to
journalism advisers, there is apparently no direct affixation of civil liability
nor express sanctions for breach of the duty established by Section 48916.
The California Government Code does impose liability upon public entities
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for injuries proximately caused by the acts or omissions of employees within
the scope of their employment [See CAL. Gov'T CODE §815.2(a)] so long as
the employee would not be immune from liability [See CAL. Gov'T CODE
§815.2(b)]. Another provision of the Government Code, however, exempts
a public employee from liability for any injury resulting from acts or
omissions arising from a permissible exercise of discretion [See CAL.
GOV'T CODE §820.2]. When these two sections are applied to the language
of Chapter 776, it is arguable that neither the teacher nor the employing
school district could be held civilly liable for libelous statements appearing
in official school publications, as the "maintenance of the provisions" of
Section 48916 would appear to require an exercise of discretion by a
journalism adviser [See CAL. EDuc. CODE §48916; CAL. Gov'T CODE
§820.2]. Thus, any sanction for breach of the statutory duty would seem to
rest upon internal public school disciplinary mechanisms.
Judicial precedents in the area of student freedoms of speech and press
have fully explicated most of the terms used in Section 48916 [See Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (con-
stitutional rights of students); Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490
F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973) (obsenity and free speech); Poxon v. Board of
Educ., 341 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Cal. 1971) (prior restraint of student rights);
Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 139, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1973) (prior restraint as "incitation")]. The greatest difficulty in the
areas of student freedoms of speech and expression occurs in the area of
"prior restraint" and whether or not it is a proper method of regulating
student behavior. The United States Supreme Court has spoken generally to
this problem on many occasions [See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)], framing the issue of prior restraint in terms of
what is constitutionally protected speech and expression, and thus not
subject to prior restraint, and stating that "[t]he special vice of a prior
restraint is that communication will be suppressed . . . before an adequate
determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment" [Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973)]. It would appear, therefore, that a statutory enactment that attempts
to separate "protected" from "unprotected" speech, as does Chapter 776
by explicitly excepting libelous, slanderous, obscene and inciting language
from its protections against restraint [See CAL. EDUC. CODE §48916],
should be examined in light of prior case law concerning similar restrictions
on speech. One federal district court, for example, has indicated that any
prior restraint comes before the courts under a "heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity" [Poxon v. Board of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 256,
257 (E.D. Cal. 1971)]. Beyond the general problem of prior restraint,
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however, the scope of student rights has been further defined by a series of
California and federal court decisions. Beginning with the seminal case of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District [393 U.S.
503 (1969)], the United States Supreme Court declared that constitutional
rights of free speech and expression are not "shed . . . at the schoolhouse
gate" [Id. at 506]. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court, in Braxton
v. Municipal Court [10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1973)], held that a charge of incitation applied to support interruption of
free speech by school officials would have to be proven "a specifically
intended consequence of the speaker's plea and not a result of unreasonable
reactions by hostile on-lookers or overly zealous supporters" [Id. at 154,
514 P.2d at 703, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 903]. Arguably, the Braxton standard
will be applied to test any restraints placed upon student publications or
other student expressions pursuant to Section 48916. As to the exception for
"obscenity", a federal circuit court has declared, inter alia, that the
"prurience" standard must be met in the school environment and held that
the use of "earthy words" in a school publication was insufficient to allow
restraints on the basis of obscenity [Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs,
490 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1973)]. Finally, the California Supreme Court
expressly disallowed any prior restraint for libel or slander, calling instead
for post-distribution discipline for violations of established guidelines by a
student publication [Bright v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 18 Cal. 3d
450, 464, 556 P.2d 1090, 1099, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639, 648 (1977)]. This
prohibition was based upon the rationale that such terms as libelous and
obscene "are not sufficiently precise and understandable by school . . .
administrators unknowledgeable about the law" to permit action threatening
to constitutional rights [Id. at 464, 556 P.2d at 1098, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 647].
Chapter 776 appears to incorporate these judicial pronouncements into
California law by expressly prohibiting prior restraints, except when student
materials violate the provisions of Section 48916, and by giving school
officials the burden of showing justification without undue delay prior to
placing any limitation on student expression. Thus, school officials who
find student publications inappropriate are apparently relegated to the reme-
dies of prior injunctive action or after-the-fact discipline.
See Generally:
1) Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools, 59 GEO. L.J. 37 (1970).
2) Letwin, Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public School Campuses in Califor-
nia, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 141 (1974-75).
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Education; legal services
Education Code §§35205, 72421 (amended).
AB 1530 (Mangers); STATS 1977, Ch 386
Support: California School Boards Association
Under prior law, public secondary school governing boards were appar-
ently authorized to obtain legal services only from a district attorney or
county counsel but could, upon the approval of one of these two officers,
contract with a qualified private attorney for specialized legal services [See
CAL. EDUC. CODE §35205, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1010, §2, at
- (school districts); CAL. EDUC. CODE §72421, as amended, CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1010, §2, at - (community college districts)]. Chapter 386
removes both limitations and authorizes school and community college
district governing boards to contract with a qualified attorney in private
practice to provide any necessary legal services subject only to the written
views of the district attorney or county counsel as to the need for legal
services and the form of the contract proposed to be entered into by the
governing board [CAL. EDUC. CODE §§35205, 72421]. These written views,
however, are advisory only and are not binding on the governing boards
[CAL. EDUC. CODE §§35205, 72421]. Thus, Chapter 386 would appear to
encourage school and community college districts to seek private legal
counsel and to facilitate their obtaining such legal services.
--,% Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
